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Quantum key distribution (QKD) promises unconditional security in data communication and
is currently being deployed in commercial applications. Nonetheless, before QKD can be widely
adopted, it faces a number of important challenges such as secret key rate, distance, size, cost and
practical security. Here, we survey those key challenges and the approaches that are currently being
taken to address them.
Introduction.
Why quantum key distribution? For thousands of
years, human beings have been using codes to keep se-
crets. With the rise of the Internet and recent trends
to the Internet of Things, our sensitive personal finan-
cial and health data as well as commercial and national
secrets are routinely being transmitted through the Inter-
net. In this context, communication security is of utmost
importance. In conventional symmetric cryptographic
algorithms, communication security relies solely on the
secrecy of an encryption key. If two users, Alice and
Bob, share a long random string of secret bits – the key
– then they can achieve unconditional security by en-
crypting their message using the standard one-time-pad
encryption scheme. The central question then is: how
do Alice and Bob share a secure key in the first place?
This is called the key distribution problem. Unfortu-
nately, all classical methods to distribute a secure key
are fundamentally insecure because in classical physics
there is nothing preventing an eavesdropper, Eve, from
copying the key during its transit from Alice to Bob.
On the other hand, standard asymmetric or public-key
cryptography solves the key distribution problem by re-
lying on computational assumptions such as the hard-
ness of factoring. Therefore, such schemes do not provide
information-theoretic security because they are vulnera-
ble to unexpected future advances in hardware and algo-
rithms, including the construction of a large-scale quan-
tum computer [1].
We remark that some secrets, such as, for instance,
census data, need to be kept secret for decades (e.g. 92
years in Canada [2]). Currently, however, data transmit-
ted in 2016 is vulnerable to technological advances made
in the future as Eve might simply save the transcripts of
communication in her memory and wait for the construc-
tion, for example, of a quantum computer some time be-
fore 2108 (92 years from 2016). This is highly probable.
Recall that ENIAC, the first general purpose electronics
computer [3], which was largely inferior to modern com-
puters, was invented only 70 years ago. The US National
Security Agency is taking the threat of quantum com-
puting seriously and has recently announced transition
plans to quantum-resistant classical algorithms [4, 5].
Quantum cryptography, or more specifically, quantum
key distribution (QKD) [6–9], promises in principle un-
conditional security – the Holy Grail of communication
security – based on the laws of physics only [10–12]. QKD
has the advantage of being future-proof [13]: unlike clas-
sical key distribution, it is not possible for an eavesdrop-
per to keep a transcript of quantum signals sent in a
QKD process, owing to the quantum non-cloning theo-
rem [14, 15]. For this reason, QKD is an essential el-
ement of the future quantum-safe infrastructure, which
will include both quantum-resistant classical algorithms
and quantum cryptographic solutions. In the bigger con-
text of quantum information, there has been tremen-
dous scientific and engineering effort towards the long-
term vision of a global quantum internet [16]. Imagine
a world where only a few large-scale quantum computers
are available (just like the early days of classical comput-
ing when only a few classical computers were available
and in line with the current trend towards cloud com-
puting); users will have to access those powerful quan-
tum computers at long distances via a quantum internet.
QKD will play a central role in securing data communi-
cation links in such a quantum internet.
The potential applications of QKD include securing
critical infrastructures (for instance, the Smart Grid), fi-
nancial institutions and national defense. Experimental
QKD has been performed over distances on the order
of 100 km in standard telecom fibers as well as in free
space, while the secure key rate has now reached a few
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2Mbits per second. QKD has leaped out of the lab [17].
In China, the deployment of a 2000 km QKD network
between Shanghai and Beijing is underway; in Europe,
after the SECOQC network demonstration in 2008 [18],
the UK is now creating a quantum network facilitating
device and system trials, and the integration of quan-
tum and conventional communications; in Japan, QKD
technologies will be put into test to secure transmission
of sensitive genome data; and the US has also started
installing its own QKD network.
Why practical challenges in QKD? In this review,
we will focus on practical issues in QKD. We remark that,
historically, practical considerations in QKD have led to
ground-breaking inventions. For example, the need to
counter the photon-number-splitting attack [19] triggered
the invention of the decoy-state protocol [20–22], which
allows efficient distillation of secure keys using weak co-
herent pulse based QKD systems that once were vulner-
able. As another example, the need to counter detector
side-channel attacks has led to the discovery of measure-
ment device independent (MDI) QKD [23]. New theory
that is due to practical advances in QKD also includes,
for instance, the quantum de Finetti theorem [24], while
security loopholes in QKD are closely related to loopholes
in Bell inequality tests [25] – a key subject in the founda-
tions of quantum mechanics. These issues are therefore
of great interest to mathematicians and theoretical physi-
cists.
QKD is clearly of interest to engineers too. For
instance, practical QKD is closely linked to the de-
velopment of new single-photon detection technologies
such as superconducting nanowire single-photon detec-
tors (SNSPDs) [26], superconducting transition-edge sen-
sors (TES) [27], frequency up-conversion single photo de-
tectors [28, 29], and self-differential InGaAs avalanche
photodiodes (APDs) [30], as well as of high performance
homodyne detection techniques [31]. It is also the mo-
tivation for high-speed quantum random number gen-
erators (QRNG) [32] and broadband entangled photon
sources [33].
Practical QKD has steered innovation and is a precur-
sor in the field of Quantum Information Processing.
Outline of the review. Despite the important the-
oretical and experimental achievements, a number of
key challenges remain for QKD to be widely used for
securing everyday interactions. For instance, much effort
is being put into increasing the communication rate
and range of QKD and making QKD systems low cost,
compact and robust. New hardware such as chip-based
QKD and new software such as novel protocols are
being studied and developed. The security of practical
QKD systems is another important challenge. In order
to foil quantum hackers, protocols such as MDI-QKD
and loss-tolerant QKD [34] have been developed and
are currently being experimentally implemented. Yet,
a comprehensive theory of the model of a QKD source
remains to be constructed. To further extend the reach
of QKD, two different approaches – quantum repeaters
and ground-to-satellite QKD – are being pursued. In
view of the proliferation of mobile computing devices
including smart phones, mobile QKD applications
have also attracted recent attention. Furthermore,
the standardization of QKD components is currently
being pursued in ETSI (European Telecommunications
Standards Institute) [35]. In what follows, we will
highlight some of the above challenges and the various
approaches that are being taken to tackle them.
Main protocols and implementations.
We begin our discussion with a brief overview of the main
QKD protocols currently studied and the state-of-the-
art in their practical implementations. As our main fo-
cus here is the current challenges in the field, we refer
the reader to a recent review [9] for the necessary back-
ground on the rigorous information-theoretic (or, uncon-
ditional) security definition of QKD in the composable
framework, secure communication schemes including the
one-time pad, the standard BB84 QKD protocol, and
basic QKD components.
QKD protocols can be in essence divided with respect
to the detection technique required to recover the key in-
formation encoded in the properties of light (Fig. 1a).
In discrete-variable (DV) protocols information is typi-
cally encoded in the polarization or phase of weak coher-
ent pulses simulating true single-photon states; hence the
corresponding implementations employ single-photon de-
tection techniques. The previously mentioned BB84 and
decoy-state protocols are prominent examples in this cat-
egory. Single-photon detection techniques are also nec-
essary for the so-called distributed-phase-reference pro-
tocols, such as the coherent-one-way (COW) [36] and
differential-phase-shift (DPS) [37] protocols, where the
key information is encoded in photon arrival times or in
the phase between adjacent weak coherent pulses. On
the other hand, in continuous-variable (CV) QKD pro-
tocols information is encoded in the quadratures of the
quantized electromagnetic field, such as those of coher-
ent states [38, 39], and homodyne or heterodyne detec-
tion techniques are used in this case. Such detectors are
routinely deployed in classical optical communications,
hence the CV approach offers the possibility for imple-
mentations based only on mature telecom components.
All these protocols are prepare-and-measure in the sense
that the transmitter, Alice, sends the encoded pulses to
the receiver, Bob, who decodes as required by the spe-
cific protocol. On the contrary, in entanglement-based
protocols [7], both parties receive parts of an entangled
state and perform suitable measurements. More details
on all protocols can be found in refs. [8, 9, 40, 41].
When it comes to practical demonstrations, perfor-
mance of point-to-point links is assessed by the distance
over which secret keys can be distributed and the rate
3b d
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FIG. 1. a. Quantum key distribution systems use discrete-variable (DV) single-photon state encoding and single-photon
detection techniques or continuous-variable (CV) quadrature field amplitude encoding and homodyne (or heterodyne) detection
techniques. b. State-of-the-art experimental setup for the implementation of the decoy-state BB84 QKD protocol [42]. c. State-
of-the-art experimental setup for the implementation of the coherent state CV-QKD protocol [43]. d. Secret key generation
rates demonstrated in some representative recent QKD experiments. Note that this figure is not meant to provide an exhaustive
list of QKD implementations. Furthermore, protocol performance cannot be directly compared as different security assumptions
are considered; for instance, decoy-state BB84 is secure against general coherent attacks while COW and CV-QKD are secure
against collective attacks. QKD is a subject of active ongoing research and so further developments are likely to occur in the
near future. The loss coefficient of 0.2 dB/km in standard single-mode fibers at telecom wavelengths is assumed in this figure.
Figures adapted with permission from: a. ref. [44], c©2013 NPG, courtesy of Ping Koy Lam; b. ref. [42], c©2013 OSA; c. ref.
[43], c©2013 NPG.
of their distribution for a given security level. The se-
curity level is determined by the type of attacks con-
sidered in the corresponding security proof; demonstrat-
ing security against the so-called collective attacks [8] is
an important challenge for an implementation, however
information-theoretic security is achieved only when se-
curity against the most general (or coherent) attacks is
proven. Hence, the ultimate goal is to provide this level
of security at a speed and a distance that are compati-
ble with practical applications. Some recent implementa-
tions have provided high levels of security: several QKD
protocols have been demonstrated to provide composable
security against collective attacks using reasonable data
block sizes and practical setups, including decoy-state
BB84 [42], COW [45], and CV-QKD [43, 46]. Among
those protocols, the security of decoy-state BB84 QKD
has been extended to cover coherent attacks, for realis-
tic block sizes and with a minimal sacrifice in the secret
key rate [47, 48]. Unfortunately, for COW, the best se-
curity proof against coherent attacks currently gives a
secret key rate that only scales quadratically with the
loss [49]. For CV-QKD with coherent states and het-
erodyne detection, a composable security proof against
the most general attacks has recently been provided [50],
but the current proof techniques do not allow a positive
key rate for realistic block sizes in this case. Extending
the security proofs for the latter protocols is therefore a
pressing task in the theoretical study of QKD.
Figures 1b,c show examples of advanced fiber-optic
QKD systems allowing for real-time secret key gener-
ation over distances of 50 km with Mbit/s rates. In
Fig. 1d we summarize some important experimental
achievements from both established and emerging
QKD protocols (discussed in the following sections).
Although the security assumptions and technological
maturity vary in these implementations, these results
4illustrate the diversity of protocols and experimental
solutions that the research community has invented
to push the performance of QKD technology. Indeed,
tremendous progress has been achieved in recent years,
and avenues for further progress will be discussed in
the next section. We remark, however, that there are
fundamental limitations on what can be ultimately
achieved. Over optical fiber networks, the attenuation
of light in standard fibers at the telecom wavelength
of 1550 nm is 0.2 dB/km (or 0.16 dB/km in newly
developed ultra low loss fibers). This unavoidable loss
will not allow the range of point-to-point QKD links
to exceed a few hundreds of kilometers as with overly
excessive channel loss it would take several years to
generate just one bit even using perfect light sources and
detectors. Furthermore, with a practical lossy channel,
the ultimate key rate is upper bounded by the so-called
TGW bound [51] (see also [52] for a more recent result).
The TGW bound provides a useful benchmark for the
performance of all QKD protocol implementations.
Major challenges in performance and cost.
In the quest for high performance and low-cost QKD sys-
tems, both hardware and software solutions are currently
being pursued.
Hardware development.
Key rate. Encryption keys generated by QKD can
be used in a symmetric cipher scheme, such as AES
(Advanced Encryption Standard), which is quantum-
resistant, for enhanced security, or they can be com-
bined with the one-time-pad encryption scheme for un-
conditional security. In both cases, the secure key rate
achieved by the underlying QKD layer in a typical appli-
cation scenario is crucial. Higher secure rates allow for
a more frequent update of encryption keys in symmetric
ciphers, and for a proportional increase in the one-time-
pad communication bandwidth as this scheme requires
the key to be as long as the message.
Presently, strong disparity exists between the classical
and QKD communication rates. Classical optical com-
munications delivering speeds of 100 Gbit/s per wave-
length channel are currently being deployed [53], and a
field trial featuring 54.2 Tbit/s aggregated data rate has
recently been performed [54]. On the other hand, the
Mbit/s rates achieved by QKD systems today are suffi-
cient, for instance, for video transmission; however, it is
clear that if we want in the longer term to encrypt high
volumes of classical network traffic using the one-time-
pad, major developments on the secure key rate gener-
ated by QKD will be required.
The obtained key rate depends crucially on the perfor-
mance of the detectors used. For QKD systems employ-
ing single-photon detection techniques, high efficiency
and short dead time of the detectors are essential for
reaching a high bit rate. The latest developments on
high efficiency detectors [55–57] are extremely promis-
ing; quantum efficiencies as high as 93% at telecom wave-
lengths have been reported for SNSPDs [56], and devices
based on this technology with short dead time, low dark
count, low time jitter and high detection efficiency are
commercially available [58] (Figs. 2a,b). These results
may allow for as much as a four-fold increase in the se-
cret key rate, which currently stands at 1 Mbit/s over a
50 km fiber (or 10 dB loss) achieved using self-differential
InGaAs APDs with an ultrashort dead time [42] (Fig.
2c). Further key rate increase is possible using wave-
length or spatial mode multiplexing technologies which
have been routinely used for increasing the bandwidth in
data communications [53, 59, 60]. For CV-QKD systems,
increasing the bandwidth of the homodyne or heterodyne
detectors, while keeping at the same time the electronic
noise low, is a necessary step for increasing the key rate
beyond the 1 Mbit/s over 25 km that has been achieved
[46]. Further progress continues to be pursued, targeting
also higher efficiency, which is currently around 60% for
fiber-coupled detectors at telecom wavelengths [43]. Fur-
thermore, as shown in Fig. 1c, a practical issue in these
systems is that the strong phase reference pulse (or, lo-
cal oscillator) needs to be transmitted together with the
signal at high clock rates; recent proposals that avoid
this and use instead a local oscillator generated at Bob’s
site [61–63] are promising and will lead to more practical,
high performance implementations.
a
b
c
FIG. 2. a. Superconducting nanowire chips. b. Com-
mercial SNSPDs with high detection efficiency. c. Charac-
terization circuit for self-differencing InGaAs avalanche pho-
todiodes [64]. Figures adapted with permission from: a.
http://www.photonspot.com/, courtesy of Vikas Anant; b.
http://www.singlequantum.com/products, courtesy of Jessie
Qin-Dregely.
Distance. Extending the communication range of QKD
systems is a major driving factor for technological devel-
opments in view of future network applications. QKD
systems based on single-photon detection champion the
point-to-point communication distance (or channel loss).
Here, the low noise of single-photon detectors is the key
enabling factor; in particular, the attainable range de-
5pends on the type and operation temperature of the de-
tectors. InGaAs APDs can tolerate losses of 30 dB and
52 dB when cooled to –30◦C and –120◦C [45, 65], respec-
tively, while SNSPDs cooled to cryogenic temperatures
have been demonstrated to withstand a record loss of
72 dB [66]. This loss is equivalent to 360 km of standard
single mode fiber or about 450 km of ultra low loss fiber.
Although technologically possible, further extending the
point-to-point distance is increasingly unappealing be-
cause the channel loss will inevitably reduce the key rate
to a level of little practical relevance. This is also true
for CV-QKD systems, which are in general more sensi-
tive to losses. Here, it is crucial to keep the excess noise –
the noise exceeding the fundamental shot noise of coher-
ent states – low and especially to be able to estimate the
noise value precisely, which becomes increasingly difficult
with the distance [40, 43].
We remark that advances towards high performance
QKD systems in terms of key rate and distance are
coupled with the security guarantees offered by these
systems. For instance, achieving composable security
against general attacks requires in practice being able
to perform efficient post-processing, including parame-
ter estimation, over large data blocks with stable setups.
Particularly for CV-QKD, performing efficient error cor-
rection and precise parameter estimation is of utmost
importance [40, 67].
Cost and robustness. For QKD systems to be used in
real world applications, low cost and robustness are in-
dispensable features alongside high performance. Several
avenues are currently being pursued. First, QKD sys-
tems have been shown to coexist with intense data traf-
fic in the same fiber [68–71], thus eliminating the need
for dark fibers that are not only expensive but also often
unavailable. Access network architecture allows simulta-
neous access by a multitude of QKD users, and impor-
tantly they are compatible with full power GPON (Giga-
bit Passive Optical Network) traffic in the same network
[65, 72]. Room-temperature single-photon detectors have
been shown to be suitable for DV-QKD over up to 100 km
fiber, thus removing cooling requirements for the entire
QKD system [47, 64]; for CV-QKD cooling is unneces-
sary. All these developments help reduce deployment
cost as well as system complexity, footprint and power
consumption.
Another important avenue to address the issue of cost
and robustness is photonic integration [73]. Chip-scale
integration will bring high level of miniaturization, lead-
ing to compact and light-weight QKD modules that can
be mass-manufactured at low cost. Two main integration
platforms are currently being explored, namely silicon
(Si) [74] and indium phosphide (InP) [75], while alter-
native techniques include lithium niobate (LiNbO3) inte-
gration and glass waveguide technologies. For QKD pro-
tocols employing single-photon detection the main diffi-
culty comes from the receiver side so initial experiments
have focused on transmitter integration. A LiNbO3 in-
tegrated polarization controller was used for state prepa-
ration in a QKD implementation [76], while several tech-
niques were combined to construct a handheld QKD
sender module in ref. [77]. More recently, a QKD trans-
mitter chip that is reconfigurable to accommodate the
state preparation for several QKD protocols, including
decoy-state BB84, COW and DPS, has been developed
on InP [78] (Fig. 3).
FIG. 3. Chip architecture combining several integrated pho-
tonic devices for the implementation of DV-QKD. Figure
adapted with permission from ref. [78], courtesy of Chris
Erven.
Chip-scale QKD receivers are also progressing. Low-
loss planar-lightwave-circuits (PLCs) based on silica-
on-silicon technology have been routinely used to re-
place fiber-based asymmetric Mach-Zehnder interferom-
eters [78–80], a key enabling component for phase-based
QKD protocols. Research efforts are currently focused
on the integration of single-photon detectors using the
aforementioned techniques, which will be essential for de-
veloping complete integrated systems. CV-QKD systems
are particularly well suited for this objective because they
only require the use of standard components. Indeed, Si
photonic chips integrating many functionalities of a CV-
QKD setup, including active elements such as amplitude
and phase modulators and homodyne/heterodyne detec-
tors based on germanium (Ge) photodiodes, have been
developed [81].
Development of chip-scale QKD is still at its early
stages. Further research in this direction will help bring
the QKD technology closer to its wide adoption.
New QKD protocols.
In parallel to hardware development, much effort has also
been devoted to novel QKD protocols aiming to outper-
form the established ones. Encouragingly, this line of re-
search has led to protocols that may exhibit advantages
when certain technical constraints are in place. Below,
we discuss two protocols featuring high photon informa-
tion capacity or noise tolerance.
HD-QKD. High dimension (HD) QKD allows retrieval
of more than 1 bit from each detected photon, thus of-
fering an advantage in the photon information capacity
when the photon rate is restrained [82–84]. The choice
6for encoding is to use the arrival times of time-energy en-
tangled photon pairs [85], whose continuous nature per-
mits encoding of extremely large alphabets. A security
proof against collective attacks has been developed [86],
which was followed by a laboratory experiment demon-
strating a photon information capacity of up to 6.9 bits
per coincidence and a key rate of 2.7 Mbit/s over a 20 km
fiber [87]. While this development has narrowed the key
rate gap between entanglement based and prepare-and-
measure QKD systems, its potential in a field environ-
ment will face a challenge to maintain the near unity
interference visibility which was key to the obtained in-
formation capacity. HD-QKD without entanglement is
also possible by exploiting the spatial degree of freedom,
but its potential is restricted by the availability of high
speed modulators [88, 89].
RR-DPS-QKD. The Round-Robin (RR) DPS protocol,
which was proposed in 2014 [90], removes the need for
monitoring the channel disturbance to establish security,
in stark contrast with conventional QKD protocols (see
Fig. 4a for the principle). Instead, Eve’s information
can be tightly set, even to an arbitrarily low level,
by just choosing experimental parameters. In theory,
a positive key rate is possible for any quantum bit
error rate (QBER) lower than 50%. This extraordinary
QBER tolerance makes it attractive for deployment
when large systematic errors cannot be avoided. Shortly
after its introduction the protocol has stimulated a
number of experimental demonstrations [91–94]. The
RR-DPS-QKD protocol uses a transmitter identical
to that found in a conventional DPS system [37], but
requires a receiver that is capable of measuring the
differential phase between any two pulses within a pulse
group sent by Alice. Two different approaches are
adopted. In the first, direct approach, a combination
of optical switches and delay lines is used to bring
the intended pulses into temporal overlap and then let
them interfere [91, 93, 94] (see for example Fig. 4b).
A more ingenious approach is to let a common phase
reference interfere with all pulses sent by Alice, and
then determine the differential phase between those
pulses whose interference with the common reference
produces a photon click [92]. This approach avoids many
problems associated with the direct one, such as loss
and phase instability caused by optical delay lines and
switches, but it will require remote optical phase locking
for optimal performance. As it currently stands, the best
key rate for RR-DPS-QKD is around 10 kbit/s for a 50
km distance in fiber [93] and cannot compete with the
more mature decoy-state BB84 protocol. RR-DPS-QKD
has the advantage of being robust against encoding
errors [95], but it is vulnerable to attacks on detectors,
which will be discussed in the next section.
Major challenges in practical security.
While the security of a QKD protocol can be proven rig-
orously, its real-life implementation often contains im-
perfections that may be overlooked in the corresponding
security proof. By exploiting such imperfections, various
attacks, targeting either the source or the detectors, have
been proposed; some of them have even been demon-
strated to be effective against commercial systems [96–
98]. We refer the reader to a recent review [9] for more
details on quantum hacking and also countermeasures.
To regain security in practical QKD, several solutions,
including QKD based on testable assumptions [9], device
independent (DI) QKD [99, 100] (see also [101]), and
MDI-QKD [23], have been proposed. In the following,
we discuss some important recent developments in this
direction.
MDI-QKD. One promising long-term solution to side-
channel attacks is DI-QKD, where the security relies on
the violation of a Bell inequality and can be proven with-
out knowing the implementation details. While recent
loophole-free Bell experiments [25, 102, 103] imply that
DI-QKD could be implemented, the expected secure key
rate is nevertheless impractically low even at short dis-
tances. A more practical solution is MDI-QKD, which
is inherently immune to all side-channel attacks target-
ing the measurement device, usually the most vulnera-
ble part in a QKD system. In fact, the measurement
device in MDI-QKD can be treated as a “black box”
which could even be manufactured and operated by Eve.
Building upon [104, 105], ref. [23] proposed a practical
scheme with weak coherent pulses and decoy states (Fig.
5a), whose security against the most general coherent
attacks, taking into account the finite data size effect,
has been proved in [106] (see also ref. [101] which stud-
ied an entanglement-based representation with general
finite-dimensional systems, and ref. [107] which proposed
a DI-QKD protocol with local Bell test).
MDI-QKD [23] is a natural building block for multi-
user QKD networks, since the most expensive and com-
plicated measurement device can be placed in an un-
trusted relay and shared among many QKD users [72].
Several groups have demonstrated its feasibility. In par-
ticular, discrete-variable (DV) MDI-QKD was demon-
strated over 200 km telecom fiber in lab conditions [108]
and over 30 km deployed fibers [109]. With highly effi-
cient single-photon detectors, the tolerable channel loss
can be as high as 60 dB, which corresponds to 300 km
telecom fiber [110]. A real-life fiber based multi-user
MDI-QKD network was also implemented recently [111]
(Fig. 5c). Moreover, a 1 Mbit/s proof-of-principle MDI-
QKD experiment was performed [112], thus illustrating
the high key rate potential of DV MDI-QKD. This was
also studied in [113] for MDI-QKD employing state-of-
the-art SNSPDs; in Fig. 5b, simulation results of the
secret key rate in this case show an achievable key rate
of 0.01 bit/pulse over 25 km. With a transmission rate
of 1 GHz, this corresponds to a secret key rate of 10
Mbit/s, which is sufficient for many cryptographic ap-
7FIG. 4. a. Basic principle of RR-DPS QKD protocol [90]. b. Example of experimental implementation of the RR-DPS QKD
protocol [91]. Figures adapted with permission from: a. ref. [90], c©2014 NPG; b. ref. [91], c©2015 NPG. Courtesy of Masato
Koashi.
plications. As a comparison, we also present in Fig. 5b
the previously mentioned fundamental upper bound per
optical mode (TGW bound) [51]. We see that the key
rate of DV MDI-QKD is only about 2 orders of magni-
tude away from the TGW bound at a practical distance,
hence this protocol is suitable for high speed communi-
cations in metropolitan area networks.
It is important to emphasize that one fundamental as-
sumption in MDI-QKD is that Eve cannot interfere with
Alice and Bob’s state preparation processes. To prevent
Eve from having access to quantum signals entering Al-
ice’s or Bob’s labs and interfering with the state prepara-
tion process, MDI-QKD is commonly implemented using
independent laser sources for Alice and Bob. Recently,
gigahertz-clocked, phase-randomized pulses from inde-
pendent gain-switched lasers have been demonstrated to
interfere with high visibility, by control of the frequency
chirp and/or emission jitter [112, 114].
DDI-QKD. One drawback of MDI-QKD is that its key
rate scales quadratically with the detector efficiency.
This is because in most of existing MDI-QKD protocols
(except for [115]), secure keys are distilled from two-
fold coincidence detection events [116]. Recently, the
detector-device-independent (DDI) QKD protocol, de-
signed to bridge the strong security of MDI-QKD with
the high efficiency of conventional QKD, was proposed
[117–119]. In this protocol, the legitimate receiver em-
ploys a trusted linear optics network to decode informa-
tion on photons received from an insecure quantum chan-
nel, and then performs a Bell state measurement (BSM)
using uncharacterized detectors. One important advan-
tage of this approach is that its key rate scales linearly
with the detector efficiency. This is achieved by replacing
the two-photon BSM scheme in the original MDI-QKD
protocol (see Fig. 5a) by a single-photon BSM scheme
[120]. However, its ability to completely remove detector
side-channel attacks has yet to be proven. Either coun-
termeasures to Trojan horse attacks [121] or some trust-
worthiness to the BSM device is still required to establish
the security of DDI-QKD [122]. In fact, mathematically
the standard BB84 QKD protocol based on a four-state
modulation scheme can be formulated into a DDI-QKD
protocol [123]. This highlights the underlying connec-
tion between DDI-QKD and the BB84 protocol. Finally,
we remark that the advantage of DDI-QKD compared
to MDI-QKD becomes insignificant if high detection ef-
ficiency detectors are used in both schemes.
CV MDI-QKD. The MDI-QKD scheme has been ex-
tended recently to the CV framework [124] (see also
[125, 126] for a more restricted security analysis). In the
CV framework, both Alice and Bob prepare Gaussian-
modulated coherent states and send them to an untrusted
third party, Charlie, who measures the correlation be-
tween the incoming quantum states. The CV MDI-QKD
system requires high efficiency (> 85%) homodyne detec-
tors for a positive key rate [113]. This efficiency require-
ment has been met in recent proof-of-principle labora-
tory free-space experiments [124, 127]. However, achiev-
ing the required efficiencies in a fiber-based optical net-
work setting is more challenging, owing to the detector
coupling loss and losses by fiber network interconnects
and components [111] (see also [128] for a different per-
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FIG. 5. a. The schematic diagram of DV MDI-QKD proposed in [23]. b. Simulation results of MDI-QKD and TGW bound
[113]. DV MDI-QKD has a high key rate and is suitable for metropolitan networks. The achievable key rate is about 0.01
bit/pulse at a channel loss of 5 dB (which corresponds to 25 km telecom fiber). The key rate of DV MDI-QKD is only about
2 orders of magnitude away from the TGW bound at a practical distance. The simulation corresponds to the symmetric
MDI-QKD case where the channels between Alice and Charlie and Charlie and Bob have the same amount of losses. It assumes
high-efficiency SNSPDs with detection efficiency of 93% and dark count probability of 10−6 (per pulse) [56], and an intrinsic
error rate of 0.1% [108]. The efficiency of error correction is assumed to be 1.16. Note that if the detection efficiency is
reduced, for instance, to 50%, this induces a drop of the key rate of about a factor of 4. This means that for the metropolitan
applications of DV MDI-QKD, the requirement on detector efficiency is not stringent. c. MDI-QKD metropolitan area network
experimental field test with untrusted relays [111]. Figures adapted with permission from: a. ref. [23], c©2012 APS; b. ref.
[113], courtesy of Feihu Xu; c. ref. [111], courtesy of Qiang Zhang.
spective). When high efficiency detectors are in place,
CV MDI-QKD would require an asymmetric configura-
tion, where Charlie needs to be located close to one of
the users. Even in this case, the expected key rate of
the state-of-the-art CV MDI-QKD system drops to zero
when the channel loss is above 6 dB (corresponding to
30 km standard telecom fiber) [113, 124]. Therefore, for
long distance (> 30 km) applications, DV MDI-QKD is
currently the only option available for MDI-QKD. A reli-
able phase reference between Alice and Bob also needs to
be established in CV MDI-QKD, and may be possible to
realize using recently proposed techniques for standard
CV-QKD [61–63]. Despite these challenges, CV MDI-
QKD has the potential for very high key rates, within
one order of magnitude from the TGW bound, at rela-
tively short communication distances.
QKD with imperfect sources. Given that the secu-
rity loopholes associated with the measurement device
can be closed by MDI-QKD, an important remaining
question is how to justify the assumption of trustable
quantum state preparation, including single-mode oper-
ation, perfect global phase randomization, no side chan-
nels, etc. On one hand, the imperfections in quantum
state preparation need to be carefully quantified and
taken into account in the security proof; on the other
hand, practical countermeasures are required to prevent
Trojan horse attacks [121] on the source.
To address imperfections in quantum state prepara-
tion in QKD, a loss-tolerant protocol was proposed in ref.
[34], which makes QKD tolerable to channel loss in the
presence of source flaws (see also studies in [129, 130]).
Based on the assumption that the single-photon com-
ponents of the states prepared by Alice remain inside a
two-dimensional Hilbert space, it was shown that Eve
9cannot enhance state preparation flaws by exploiting the
channel loss and Eve’s information can be bounded by
the rejected data analysis [131]. The intuition for the se-
curity of loss-tolerant QKD protocol can be understood
in the following manner. By assuming that the state pre-
pared by Alice is a qubit, it becomes impossible for Eve
to perform an unambiguous state discrimination (USD)
attack [132]. Indeed, in order for Eve to perform a USD
attack, the states prepared by Alice must be linearly in-
dependent; but by having three or more states in a two-
dimensional space, in general the set of states prepared
by Alice is linearly dependent, thus making USD impos-
sible.
The above loss-tolerant protocol has been further de-
veloped and demonstrated experimentally in ref. [133],
where the authors implemented decoy-state QKD with
imperfect state preparation and employed tight finite-key
security bounds with composable security against coher-
ent attacks. The work in [34] has also been extended to
the finite-key regime in [134], where a wide range of im-
perfections in the laser source, such as the intensity fluc-
tuations, have been taken into account. In [135], a rigor-
ous security proof of QKD systems using discrete-phase-
randomized coherent states was given, thus removing the
requirement for perfect phase randomization. With re-
spect to this, we note that gain-switched laser diodes are
presently the de facto QKD light source, capable of nat-
urally providing phase-randomized coherent pulses at a
clock rate of up to 2.5 GHz [136].
Progress has also been made on enhancing the security
of QKD by carefully examining source imperfections in
implementations. Refs. [137, 138], studied the risk of
Trojan horse attacks due to back reflections from com-
monly used optical components in QKD. Similar research
was also conducted for CV-QKD [139]. In [140], by us-
ing laser-induced damage threshold of single-mode opti-
cal fiber to bound the photon numbers in Eve’s Trojan
horse pulses, the authors provided quantitative security
bounds and a purely passive solution against a general
Trojan horse attack.
All the above advances strongly suggest the feasibility
of long distance secure quantum communication with im-
perfect sources. A promising research direction is to ap-
ply the above techniques for QKD with imperfect sources
to MDI-QKD leading to practical side-channel-free QKD.
To achieve this goal, it is necessary to establish a com-
prehensive list of assumptions on the sources, and verify
them one by one. In a recent experimental demonstration
[141], the loss-tolerant protocol is applied to a MDI-QKD
setting. Such an experiment thus addresses source and
detector flaws at the same time.
We end our discussion on practical security by noting
that in both classical and quantum cryptography, it is
also important to carefully address the risks of side-
channel attacks on the electronics and post-processing
layers. Various side-channel attacks discovered in clas-
sical cryptography, such as the timing attack [142], the
power-monitoring attack [143], and acoustic cryptanaly-
sis [144], can also pose threats to quantum cryptography.
Closing these side channels requires substantial future
efforts.
Network QKD.
So far, our discussion has been largely limited to point-to-
point QKD links. While these links are useful for some
applications, QKD network structures must be consid-
ered in order to enable access by a greater many users and
also to extend the reach and geographical coverage. Ad-
ditionally, the incorporation of mobile QKD nodes for key
transports will add to network connection flexibility and
allow even greater geographical coverage. In the follow-
ing, we discuss approaches for building a QKD network
and possibilities for future mobile QKD deployment.
Building QKD networks. An important issue in a
network setting is the topology that allows for multiple
users to access the network. A star topology is suitable
for this purpose for relatively short distance (up to 400
km). Imagine a star network where there is at most one
intermediate node between any two users, allowing for
secure quantum communication among all users without
the need for the relay to be trusted. In fact, this approach
has already been demonstrated based on the MDI-QKD
protocol [111]. The long-term vision is for each user to
use a simple and cheap transmitter and outsource all
the complicated devices for network control and mea-
surement to an untrusted network operator. Since only
one set of measurement devices will be needed for such a
network that is shared by many users, the cost per user
could be kept relatively low. The network provider would
then be in a favorable position to deploy state-of-the-art
technologies including high detection efficiency SNSPDs
to enhance the performance of the network and to per-
form all network management tasks. The important ad-
vantage is that the network operator can be completely
untrusted without compromising security. Experimental
demonstrations of network MDI-QKD, either in optical
fibers [111] or in free space, are a major step towards
such QKD networks with untrusted relays.
Nonetheless, MDI-QKD is limited in distance, hence in
order to address the great challenge of extending the dis-
tance of secure QKD, three further approaches are possi-
ble. The first and the simplest approach is to use trusted
relays. This is already feasible with current technology
and indeed has been used as the standard in existing
QKD networks [18, 145]. By setting up trusted nodes,
for instance, every 50 km, to relay secrets, it is possible
to achieve secure communication over arbitrarily long dis-
tances. The QKD network currently under development
between Shanghai and Beijing is based on this approach.
The second approach is quantum repeaters, which re-
move the need for the users to trust the relay nodes.
Quantum repeaters are beyond current technology, but
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have been a subject of intense research efforts in recent
years. The long-term vision here is to construct a global
quantum internet as described, for example, in ref. [16].
Research efforts on quantum repeaters have focused on
matter quantum memories and their interface with pho-
tonic flying qubits [146, 147]. However, new recent ap-
proaches manage to reduce the need for a quantum mem-
ory [148] or to completely remove it by using all-photonic
quantum repeaters [149].
Finally, the third approach is ground-to-satellite QKD.
By using one or a few trusted satellites as relay stations,
it is possible to extend the distance of secure QKD to
the global scale. To this end, several free-space stud-
ies, including experiments with low earth orbit (LEO)
satellites, have been conducted [150–156]. China, the
EU and Canada are all currently exploring experimental
ground-to-satellite QKD in ambitious long-term projects
involving LEO satellites.
Mobile QKD. The studies in free-space QKD may
also open the door to mobile QKD networks, which
can be useful in many applications, such as ship-to-ship
communication, airport traffic control, communication
between autonomous vehicles, etc. In such a network,
the mobility of QKD platforms requires the network
to be highly reconfigurable – the QKD users should
be able to automatically determine the optimal QKD
route in real time based on their locations. Fast beam
tracking systems are indispensable. Furthermore, due to
the strong ambient light, an effective filtering scheme is
required to selectively detect quantum signals. A recent
study shows that CV-QKD based on coherent detection
could be robust against ambient noise photons due to
the intrinsic filtering function of the local oscillator
[157]. We also note that preliminary studies suggest
that QKD at microwave wavelengths, which are widely
used in wireless communications, might be feasible over
short distances [158, 159]. Driven by various potential
applications, we expect that mobile QKD will become
an active research topic in the coming years.
Conclusion.
In this review, we have discussed important challenges
in practical QKD. These range from extending security
proofs to the most general attacks allowed by quantum
mechanics to developing photonic chips as well as side-
channel-free systems and global-scale QKD networks.
Addressing these challenges using some of the approaches
that we have presented will open the way to the use of
QKD technology for securing everyday interactions.
As the lead application of the field of Quantum Infor-
mation Processing, advances in QKD will have impor-
tant implications in many other applications too. For
example, a great range of quantum communication pro-
tocols beyond QKD have been studied in recent years
and their development has directly benefited from re-
search in QKD. These include, for instance, quantum
bit commitment [160–162], quantum secret sharing [163–
165], quantum coin flipping [166, 167], quantum finger-
printing [168, 169], quantum digital signatures [170, 171],
blind quantum computing [172, 173], and position-based
quantum cryptography [174–176]. It is known that some
of those protocols, such as quantum bit commitment and
position-based quantum cryptography, cannot be per-
fectly achieved with unconditional security. However,
other security models exist, such as, for instance, those
based on relativistic constraints or on noisy storage as-
sumptions [177], where by assuming that it is impossible
for an eavesdropper to store quantum information for a
long time, one can retrieve security for such protocols.
Determining the exact power and limitations of quan-
tum communication is the subject of intense research ef-
forts worldwide. The formidable developments that can
be expected in the next few years will mark important
milestones towards the quantum internet of the future.
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